Approved For Rolease 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T009754608800320001-9

TOP SECRET

25X1

18 March 1966

Copy No.

25X1

14



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

18 March 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

			25X1
	2.	Indonesia: Army moves to complete assumption of power. (Page 4)	
			25X 1
	4.	Ghana: Nkrumah trying to gather support for a comeback attempt. (Page 7)	
	5.	Uganda: Situation remains unstable. (Page 8)	
	6.	USSR: Pressures on leadership by elements anxious to check reactionary trend in intellectual sphere. (Page 9)	
	7.	Colombia: National Front failure to win congressional majority may force change in system of government. (Page 11)	
25X1	8.	Notes: Turkey; Chile;	25X



*Indonesia: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)

The army appears to be moving to complete the assumption of power it began last weekend.

Radio Djakarta this morning announced that 15 leftist cabinet ministers, including the army's principal target, Foreign Minister Subandrio, had been placed under "protective custody." The announcement, issued by General Suharto on "behalf" of President Sukarno, stated that the ministers had been "made secure" in order to protect them from the wrath of the "Indonesian people who are becoming restless and uncontrollable."

Shortly before this announcement, an order was broadcast placing all information media under army control, and listeners were instructed to tune in for subsequent important announcements.

25X1


The army's moves this morning came in the wake of continuing resistance from Sukarno, who, almost immediately after his delegation of authority to Suharto, began maneuvering to regain the initiative. General Suharto had by yesterday come under strong pressure from various army and civilian elements to substitute direct action for the army's original plan to generate popular demands for reforms in the hope that Sukarno would accede to them.

(continued)

18 Mar 66

4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt



Despite this Soviet effort to appear responsive to Nkrumah's plight, the Soviet Union has tried to maintain correct diplomatic relations with the new Ghanaian regime. Accra announced yesterday that the Soviet Union had extended recognition to the regime.

Uganda: The situation remains unstable in the wake of Prime Minister Obote's seizure of supreme power three weeks ago.

Obote's actions, including the suspension of the constitution and the displacement of the president and vice president, appear to have alienated most tribal and political elements. He has not yet succeeded in broadening his base of power in the vital south beyond the army and police.

Although the army continues to follow orders of Obote and its commander, Colonel Amin, it is divided between northerners who support Obote and those who resent the ouster of former army chief Opoloto and sympathize with southern moderates.

The US Embassy in Kampala reports a consensus of informed opinion that Obote cannot hold power on his present basis "for more than a matter of weeks or months." His actions are being contested in the courts,

25X1

2511

18 Mar 66

8

USSR: Pressures are being brought to bear on the Soviet leadership by elements in the USSR and Eastern Europe who are anxious to check a reactionary trend in the intellectual sphere.

The effort has apparently been launched now in the hope that the regime can be dissuaded from adopting a line at the forthcoming Party Congress which would reinforce the hard tendency. Soviet intellectuals are concerned by the Stalinist overtones of the recent trial of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel—the first of its kind since Stalin's death. This concern has been heightened by recurrent rumors and by articles appearing in the Soviet press which suggest that a re-evaluation of the Stalin period is being considered.

Some 40 to 50 Soviet writers reportedly have sent the Soviet leaders a signed petition protesting the handling of the Sinyavsky and Daniel cases.

a petition signed by 25 leading Soviet intellectuals was sent to Party Secretary Brezhnev warning against any effort to whitewash Stalin's image at the Party Congress, which is due to open on 29 March.

Word that the Russians are considering a new line on Stalin has reached foreign Communist parties.

/an attempt will be made at the Party Congress to gloss over Stalin's crimes and errors, but his accomplishments will now be given mention as well.

Rather than a "rehabilitation" in the usual Soviet sense,

an attempt to present a more "balanced picture" of the Stalinist period.

Reactions so far in Eastern Europe indicate that Russian efforts to rehabilitate Stalin, even partially, are creating apprehension and concern in several countries. In addition, some party leaders have no wish to see the issue revived. The effect of any such move by

18 Mar 66

25 3

9

25X1

25X1

18 Mar 66

10

Colombia: Failure by the ruling National Front to obtain a two-thirds majority in the congressional election on 20 March may force a change in Colombia's system of government.

The National Front system requires government by coalition until 1974. By constitutional arrangement, the Conservative and Liberal parties share equally all government posts, including seats in Congress. The presidency alternates between them at four-year intervals.

An election is therefore not a contest between the two parties, but among factions within them. In essence, it pits those who favor the National Front and its presidential candidate against those who, for varying reasons, are opposed.

Under current alignments the Official Liberals and the Ospinista faction of the Conservative Party represent the National Front. The opposition is composed of the National Popular Alliance of former dictator Rojas Pinilla (nominally Conservative), the Communist-supported Liberal Revolutionary Movement, and the so-called Lauro-Alzatista Conservatives. The Lauro-Alzatistas may rejoin the National Front following the election.

All seats in both houses of Congress are at stake in Sunday's election. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, a Liberal, is the National Front's candidate and the likely winner in a separate presidential election on 1 May. If the opposition wins a majority in Congress, as is expected, or even a third of the seats, Lleras will face serious difficulty in governing. Most important legislation requires a two-thirds vote of Congress for passage. Lleras might find it necessary to govern by decree pending development of a more workable government system.

(continued)

18 Mar 66

11

The Colombian military are traditionally aloof from politics, but if they saw a threat to themselves or to the country through expansion of the influence of the National Popular Alliance and the Liberal Revolutionary Movement they might feel impelled to intervene.

Security forces are on alert to ensure that the 20 March elections are conducted peacefully. Fraud is not expected to be a significant factor.

25X1

18 Mar 66

12

2 5×1	Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800320001-9	
		25X1
	NOTES	
	Turkey: A new anti-Communist campaign by the Turkish Government could result in serious violence between rightist and leftist groups. In the past ten days some 16 persons have been arrested for Communist activities and a purge of known and suspected Communists in the civil service and universities is being planned. Over 60 rightist organizations have scheduled an anti-Communist rally in Istanbul for Sunday, and the US consul general warns that the demonstrations could get out of hand. Chile: The nationwide work stoppage and the miners' march on Santiago called for by the Chilean workers' confederation earlier this week failed to attract wide support. The government and the Communist-Socialist Popular Action Front can be expected to keep up their political polemic over the clashbe-	25X1
	tween labor's demands and the requirements of the country's economic programs. Both the government and responsible labor leaders, however, appear anxious to avoid further violence over these problems.	25X1
	18 Mar 66 13	
		2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

TOP SECRET